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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3297 
 ___________ 
 
 DAVID MEYERS, 
Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
WARDEN R. MARTINEZ 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-1151) 
 District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 12, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 David Meyers, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at USP-Allenwood in 
Pennsylvania, seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because we perceive 
no errors in the District Court’s resolution of Meyers’ claims, we will affirm its judgment. 
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 Meyers is serving a prison sentence of 63 months, imposed on December 17, 2009, 
following his guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
1
  Pursuant to a federal 
detainer, Meyers was held in custody on the crime of conviction between February 16, 
2007, and the date of his sentencing.  Immediately preceding that period, Meyers had 
been held in state custody for 75 days (between December 1, 2006, and February 15, 
2007) on a state charge that was eventually nolle prossed.  All told, then, Meyers spent 
1,112 days in custody prior to sentencing.
2
  Accordingly, the BOP set Meyers’ projected 
release date, after factoring in good time credits, at July 8, 2011.  The BOP set the date of 
his eligibility for home detention at January 8, 2011. 
 Meyers’ § 2241 petition, filed in May 2010, contained ten claims, which the 
District Court ably summarized as follows: 
 1) Respondent directed BOP staff to place Meyers in the General Population where 
     an inmate was waiting to kill him . . . ; 
 
 2) the BOP failed to properly credit the time Meyers spent confined in the Federal  
      Detention Center (“FDC”) Philadelphia . . . ; 
 
 3) the BOP failed to follow the direction of the sentencing court to place Petitioner 
        in a federal medical center to receive psychiatric treatment . . . ; 
                                                 
 
1
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted the 
Government’s motion to dismiss Meyers’ direct appeal, based on the appellate waiver 
contained in the plea agreement, by order entered August 18, 2010.  Meyers’ motion to 
vacate his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, is currently pending in the Eastern 
District of Virginia.    
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 2008 was a leap year. 
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 4) there is no Mental Health Unit (“MHU”) at USP Allenwood . . . ; 
 
 5) Respondent refuses to stop performing PPD skin tests on Petitioner . . . ; 
 
 6) Respondent has informed inmates . . . that Petitioner is an informant . . . ; 
 
 7) the BOP . . . is denying him [home] release and has untruthfully scored his   
               security classification level . . . ; 
 
 8) Petitioner’s projected release date and home detention eligibility date are            
               incorrect . . . ; 
 
 9) on February 23, 2010, Respondent allowed an inmate to be placed in                  
     Petitioner’s cell, and the inmate stabbed, cut, and sexually assaulted Petitioner . . 
     . ; and 
 
 10) on April 24, 2010, Respondent again allowed an inmate to be placed in  
       Petitioner’s cell, and the inmate held Petitioner hostage . . . . 
(DC dkt #5.)  The District Court summarily dismissed without prejudice six of the ten 
claims in the petition (numbers 1, 4-6, 9 and 10) because those claims challenged the 
conditions of Meyers’ confinement, and thus were not properly raised in habeas corpus 
proceedings.  The warden of USP-Allenwood, R. Martinez, was then ordered to respond 
to Meyers’ habeas petition.  By order entered July 9, 2010, the District Court denied the 
remaining claims in Meyers’ habeas petition (numbers 2, 3, 7, and 8), concluding that 
they were both unexhausted and without merit.  Meyers timely appealed. 
  The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and 
our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  A certificate of 
appealability is not required for Meyers’ appeal.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 
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146 (3d Cir. 2009).  We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s denial of habeas 
corpus relief.  McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 935 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010).  The District 
Court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.  Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 
310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 The District Court properly dismissed Meyers’ conditions of confinement claims 
without prejudice to Meyers’ ability to pursue those claims in a civil rights action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See McGee, 627 F.3d at 936 (“the fact that a civil rights claim is filed 
by a prisoner rather than by an unincarcerated individual does not turn a § 1983 case or a 
Bivens action into a habeas petition . . . even where the complained-of condition of 
confinement creates, as a secondary effect, the possibility that the plaintiff will serve a 
longer prison term than that to which he would otherwise have been subject.”).  We also 
agree with the District Court that Meyers failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
with respect to the other four claims in the habeas petition.  See Gambino v. Morris, 134 
F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Ordinarily, federal prisoners are required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies prior to seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.”).  It was Meyers’ burden, see Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 488 (3d Cir. 
2001), to prove that he exhausted his administrative remedies—here, completion of the 
BOP’s multi-tier Administrative Remedy Program—and he failed to do so.3 
 Furthermore, we agree with the District Court that Meyers’ habeas claims related 
                                                 
 
3
  Specifically, by his own records, Meyers failed to pursue any denied grievance 
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to the BOP’s security classification and sentence calculations are without merit, for 
substantially the reasons given in the District Court’s opinion.  Importantly, Meyers has 
failed to demonstrate on appeal that any of the District Court’s factual findings are clearly 
erroneous.  Finally, while Meyers’ third claim—that the BOP is defying a court order that 
he “receive mental health services at a Federal Medical Center (DC dkt #1, pg. 3)—also 
lacks merit, we note that the Eastern District of Virginia did order Meyers to undergo 
psychiatric evaluations at FMC Butner from November 2007 to March 2008, and then 
again from September 2008 to March 2009, during the pendency of the underlying 
criminal proceedings.  The “Special Conditions of Supervision” section of Meyers’ 
criminal judgment states that, “[w]hile on supervised release, pursuant to this Judgment . . 
. [t]he defendant shall participate in a program approved by the Probation Office for 
mental health treatment.”  (DC dkt #7, Attachment 3, pg. 4.)  On appeal, Warden 
Martinez states that “[a]ny mental health treatment Meyers receives aside from that is 
squarely within the discretion of the BOP.”  (Resp. Br. at 13.)  To the extent feasible, we 
encourage the BOP to exercise that discretion. 
 The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
beyond the Regional Office level.  (DC dkt #11.) 
